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Fire Sales, Foreign Entry and Bank Liquidity
Abstract
Bank liquidity is a crucial determinant of the severity of banking crises. We consider the
e¤ect of re sales and foreign entry during crises on banks ex-ante choice of liquid asset
holdings. In a setting with limited pledgeability of risky cash ows and di¤erential expertise
between banks and outsiders in employing banking assets, the market for assets clears only
at re-sale prices following the onset of a crisis and outsiders may enter the market if prices
fall su¢ ciently low. While re sales make it attractive for banks to hold liquid assets, foreign
entry reduces this incentive. We show that in this setting, bank liquidity is counter-cyclical
whereas bank capital measured as bank prots is pro-cyclical. We derive conditions under
which privately optimal levels of bank liquidity are higher or lower than benchmark levels
that maximize total output of the banking sector. We present and discuss evidence on bank
liquidity that is consistent with model predictions.
J.E.L. Classication: G21, G28, G32, E58, D61
Keywords: Cash, Cash holdings, Crises, Systemic risk, Distress, Liquidation cost, Limited
pledgeability
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1 Introduction
A central di¢ culty during banking crises is one of nding ready buyers of distressed assets: If
a bank needs to restructure its balance sheet during a crisis, the potential buyers of its assets
are other banks that may have also been severely a¤ected and thus may not have enough
equity capital or debt capacity to purchase assets. This theme is a familiar one from corporate
nance (see Williamson, 1988, and Shleifer and Vishny, 1992), but leads to especially severe
problems in a banking crisis given the relative opacity of bank balance-sheets and the high
sensitivity of banking assets to macroeconomic shocks. Allen and Gale (1998) have shown
in the context of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) setup that asset prices fall below their
fundamental value in some states of the world, giving rise to cash-in-the-market(or re-
sale) pricing. Surviving banks that do have enough liquidity during such states stand to make
windfall prots from purchasing assets at re-sale prices. Even if crises arrive infrequently,
the potential gains from acquisitions at re sales could be large. This gives banks incentives
to hold liquid assets so that in the event that they survive the crisis, they will have resources
to take advantage of re sales.1
Our objective in this paper is to present a model of bankschoice of ex-ante liquidity that is
driven by such strategic considerations. We examine the portfolio choice of banks maximizing
their prots in the presence of re sales that are endogenously derived in an equilibrium setup
of the banking industry. While risky assets are attractive to banks given their limited liability,
risky assetscash ows are illiquid and have limited pledgeability compared to cash ows of
safe assets (which we assume are fully pledgeable). This limited pledgeability of risky cash
ows, coupled with the potential for future acquisitions at re-sale prices, induces banks
to hold liquid assets in their portfolios. In essence, bank portfolio choice acquires an inter-
temporal dimension even in our otherwise myopic set-up.2
In this setting, we show that banks equilibrium holding of liquid assets is decreasing
1Cleveland and Thomas in their book Citibank provide a memorable account of how National City Bank,
that eventually became Citibank, grew from a small treasury unit into one of the biggest commercial banks
under its president Stillman, who anticipated the 1893 and 1907 crises and built up liquidity and capital
before the crises to benet from the di¢ culties of its competitors. We describe this case in greater detail in
Section 5.
2Indeed, we show that this dimension arises in our model purely due to benet from holding liquid assets
while purchasing failed banks, and not from the more standard precautionary desire for holding liquidity to
avoid default.
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in the pledgeability of risky cash ows. In turn, bank liquidity is counter-cyclical, that is,
decreasing in the health of the economy: During economic upturns, expected prots from
risky assets are high and so is their pledgeability. An important implication of this result
is that adverse asset-side shocks that follow good times result in deeper re-sale discounts
since bank balance-sheets feature low liquidity in such times, whereby conditional on adverse
shocks, there is lower aggregate liquidity to clear market for assets. In sharp contrast to
this counter-cyclical behavior of bank liquidity, bank capitalmeasured as the expected
value of bank prots or in other words market value of bank equity  is pro-cyclical. The
intuition is simple: during upturns, opportunity cost of not investing in risky assets is high
and anticipated pledgeability of future prots is high too. Put another way, during upturns,
capital in the form of expected prots is a more e¢ cient way for banks to create future
liquidity, whereas in downturns, liquid assets play this role more e¢ ciently.
We also compare the privately optimal levels of bank liquidity with benchmark levels that
maximize the overall banking sector output. The pledgeability of risky cash ows turns out
to be the critical determinant of whether banks hold too little or too high liquidity relative
to the socially optimal level. When pledgeability is high, banks hold less liquidity than is
socially optimal due to the preference for risk induced by limited liability; otherwise, banks
may hold even more liquidity than is socially optimal in order to capitalize on re sales. This
latter result may seem surprising but is explained simply: Fire sales result in transfers of value
amongst banks but do not lead to any aggregate welfare gains or costs, and thus, liquidity
hoarded to capitalize on re sales may in some cases be excessive from the standpoint of
maximizing banking sector output. In particular, ine¢ ciently high levels of bank liquidity
and by implication ine¢ ciently low levels of intermediation arise when pledgeability of risky
cash ows is su¢ ciently low, for example, during crises or in banking sectors of emerging
markets.
We present descriptive cross-country evidence on the asset liquidity of banks across coun-
tries. This evidence suggests that bankschoice of liquidity seems to vary along dimensions
that would be correlated with di¢ culty in raising external nance and the severity of nan-
cial distress. We show that banks hold more liquid assets in those countries that have (i)
less developed accounting standards; (ii) lower total market capitalization relative to GDP;
and, (iii) lower liquidity in stock markets. We also discuss how our models implication that
bank liquidity would be counter-cyclical squares up with existing evidence and the recently
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documented facts concerning leverage targeting by banks.
We conclude by reverting to the model and analyzing the e¤ect of entry by outsiders
(outside of the banking sector) for acquisition of assets during crises. Since outsiders may
lack expertise relative to surviving banks, they may enter only when re sales are su¢ ciently
deep. Nevertheless, once they enter, they have the e¤ect of increasing the aggregate pool of
liquidity and stabilizing prices. This reduces ex-ante returns to liquidity for banks and they
hold lower levels of liquid assets in their portfolios. This implies that even when outsiders are
second-best users of assets, their entry can potentially unlock liquid hoardings of banks in
emerging markets and lead to greater intermediation by their banking sectors.
Section 2 presents the related literature. Sections 3 and 4 set up the benchmark model
without outsiders and characterize the e¤ect of re sales on bank liquidity. Section 5 provides
descriptive empirical evidence. Section 6 considers the e¤ect of entry by liquidity-endowed
outsiders on bank liquidity. Section 7 concludes. All proofs not in the main text are in the
Appendix.
2 Related literature
The relationship between liquidity and asset prices has been used in the literature to examine
a number of interesting issues such as nancial market runs (Bernardo and Welch, 2004,
and Morris and Shin, 2004), strategic lending and trading (Donaldson, 1992, Brunnermeier
and Pedersen, 2005 and Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer, 2007), contagion through asset
prices (Gorton and Huang, 2004, Schnabel and Shin, 2004, Allen and Gale, 2005, Cifuentes,
Ferrucci and Shin, 2005, and Diamond and Rajan, 2005), and optimal resolution of bank
failures (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2005, 2007). While liquidity can a¤ect asset prices, most
of the literature cited above treats the level of liquidity (of banks) as exogenous, excepting a
few papers that are discussed below.
Banks can hold liquidity for various reasons such as the precautionarymotive of insuring
against their depositorsuncertain liquidity needs and the strategicmotive of being able
to take advantage of protable options when they arise. We abstract from the precautionary
motive which nds a strong parallel in the corporate-nance literature on rmspropensity
to save in the form of cash holdings (see, for example, Acharya, Almeida and Campello, 2007,
and the large literature cited therein). Instead, we focus exclusively on the strategic one, the
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protable option being the opportunity to acquire other banksassets cheap. On this score,
our paper is more in the spirit of recent papers by Allen and Gale (2004a,b) and Gorton and
Huang (2004) who also investigate how liquidity is endogenously determined.3 ;4
Our paper di¤ers from these recent papers along the following dimensions. First, in con-
trast to these papers, we do not model bank runs as an endogenous choice of depositors.
Instead, we simply assume that deposits are hard contracts and thus bank failures occur
whenever asset shocks are su¢ ciently adverse. Second, and more substantively, we derive
interesting comparative static results as to how bank liquidity is a¤ected by ease of external
nance and the business cycle. These results are made possible by the fact that our model
does not rule out external nancing against risky cash ows altogether, but instead consid-
ers as a model parameter the limited pledgeability of risky cash ows arising from moral
hazard considerations, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). Under this limited pledgeability
framework, we are also able to address the key welfare issues connected with entry of outside
capital and whether the private level of bank liquidity is the e¢ cient one.5
We acknowledge that since liquid assets usually have lower returns than illiquid assets,
banks may rationally choose to rely on liquidity from an interbank market or a lender of last
resort (LOLR). Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) build a model of the interbank market where
individual banks that are subject to liquidity shocks coinsure each other against these shocks
through a borrowing-lending mechanism. However, in their model, the composition of liquid
and illiquid assets in each banks portfolio and the liquidity shocks are private information.
3Allen and Gale (2004b), for example, build a model where runs by depositors result in re-sale liquidation
of banking assets. Banks endogenously choose the level of the liquid asset, which they use to purchase banking
assets. Since on average the liquid asset has a lower return than the risky asset, banks have to be compensated
for holding liquid assets, which is possible in equilibrium if they can purchase the risky asset at a discount in
some states of the world, leading to cash-in-the-market pricing.
4Note that Diamond and Rajan (2005) also features re-sale opportunities. However, in their model, date-
0 depositors are assumed to care only about date-1 return and banks maximize their date-0 nancing from
these depositors. Hence, even though there is a high return to cash holdings in their model in some states
of the world, banks never hold cash as cash yields benets only in future (beyond date 1). While we do not
endogenize debt capacity of the rm at date 0 as Diamond and Rajan do, the critical di¤erence is that banks
in our model maximize the sum of current and future prots.
5It should also be noted that since moral hazard arises only because insiders have expertise with regard to
risky assets, our modeling assumptions are consistent with outside capital being second-best user of banking
assets. This explains why outside capital does not enter during crises until discounts are steep so that a high
shadow value of capital may co-exist with ready funds (waiting) outside the system at the onset of crises. A
similar theme is explored in an asset pricing context by He and Krishnamurthy (2006) and the international
nance context by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001).
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Hence, banks have an incentive to under-invest in liquid assets and free-ride on the common
pool of liquidity in the interbank market. Repullo (2005) shows that the existence of LOLR
results in banks holding a lower level of the liquid asset as they rely on the LOLR for liquidity.
While we do not consider inter-bank lending in this paper, we do discuss in Section 7 the
implications in our setup of regulatory closure policies on bank liquidity.
Finally, while our model shares some similarities with Acharya and Yorulmazer (2005),
especially in the way in which re sales are derived and entry by outsiders is modeled, the
focus of the two papers is completely di¤erent. In Acharya and Yorulmazer (2005), it is
assumed that banks invest all their funds in risky assets whereas the focus of the current
paper is the endogenous interior choice of liquidity in bank portfolios.
3 Benchmark model
Before presenting the model formally, we give an informal description of the building blocks
and the key assumptions. We consider a setting with a large number of banks. Banks solve
a portfolio choice problem: they maximize their prots, or in other words, equity values, by
choosing how much to invest in risky assets, which are assumed to have diminishing returns to
scale, and how much to park in the safe asset as liquid reserves. This portfolio choice problem
acquires an inter-temporal dimension given the limited pledgeability of risky cash ows and
the benet from holding liquidity in states where banks can prot from asset purchases at
re-sale discounts. Specically, while banks have a preference for the risky asset due to its
optionvalue in the traditional risk-shifting sense, there is a counteracting preference for
the safe asset due to its greater liquidity relative to the risky asset.
Bankschoice of liquidity trades o¤ the expected returns from the two kinds of assets
taking account of the option value of the risky asset and the need for inter-temporal transfers
of liquidity. The benchmark socially optimal level of liquid asset holdings in banksportfolio
maximizes the value of banking sector as a whole, that is, the sum of the values of banks
(rather than just banksequity values). For most of our analysis, we assume that when banks
fail, the only potential purchasers are other banks. We also assume that deposits are insured
by the regulator and that there is no cost of providing insurance to depositors, in which case
the assumption of insured deposits does not play a key role in determination of liquidity
choices of banks. We introduce entry by outsiders in Section 6 and discuss in Section 7 the
5
implications of costly deposit insurance.
The time line of the benchmark model is outlined in Figure 1. We consider an economy
where time is indexed by t, where t 2 0; 1
2
; 1; 2
	
. In the benchmark model, there are banks,
bank owners, depositors and a regulator, who provides deposit insurance.
In particular, we assume that there is a continuum of banks with measure 1, where each
bank has access to its own depositor base. The depositor base of a bank is itself a continuum
of depositors of measure 1. Bank owners as well as depositors are risk-neutral, so that banks
aim to maximize the equity value of the sum of expected prot over time.
Depositors receive a unit endowment at t = 0 and at t = 1. Depositors have access to a
reservation investment opportunity that gives them a utility of 1 per unit of investment. At
dates t = 0 and t = 1, depositors choose to invest their good in this reservation opportunity
or in their bank. Deposits take the form of a simple debt contract with maturity of one period
and the promised deposit rate is not contingent on banks investment decisions or its realized
returns.
Banks collect one unit of deposits from depositors and make investments to maximize the
sum of expected prots at t = 1 and t = 2. There is no discounting. In particular, banks
choose a portfolio by investing l units in a safe asset and the remaining (1  l) units in a risky
asset, which is to be thought of as a portfolio of loans to rms in the corporate sector.
The payo¤ of the bank from its loan is eRt, where eRt is the random variable:
eRt =  Rt with prob t
0 with prob 1  t : (1)
Rt can be viewed as the notional value of the loan. The realization of eRt is independent
across banks, so that by the law of large numbers, precisely t of the banks have positive
payo¤. Moreover, the returns are assumed to be independent over time.
However, there is aggregate uncertainty in that t is itself random. Hence, there is
uncertainty over the proportion of banks that receive positive payo¤. In what follows, we
will denote by E (t) the expected realization of t.
We assume that the risky technology eR0 has diminishing returns to scale, that is, the
return R0 is decreasing in (1   l). In order to get a closed form solution, we use a setup
similar to Holmstrom and Tirole (2001) and let
R0(l) = b  (1  l)
2
: (2)
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Hence, R0 takes values between
 
b  1
2

and b; and dR0
dl
= 1
2
> 0. For simplicity we assume
that eR1 is a constant returns to scale technology with R1 > 11 . This helps us concentrate on
the e¤ect of choice of liquid asset only in the rst period and simplies the analysis.
At the intermediate date t = 1
2
; the outcome of the rst-period investments in the risky
asset becomes public information, though banks can collect these returns fully only at t = 1.
The safe asset is completely liquid and pays one unit at any date for each unit invested.
The risky asset is however not completely liquid due to a moral-hazard problem at the bank
level. From date t = 1=2 to date t = 1, if the bank does not exert e¤ort, then when the
return is high, it cannot generate R0 but only
 
R0  

and its owners enjoy a non-pecuniary
benet of B 2 (0;): For the bank owners to exert e¤ort, appropriate incentives have to be
provided by giving bank owners a minimum share of the banks prots. We denote this share
as . If r0 is the cost of borrowing deposits, then the incentive-compatibility constraint is:
0(R0   r0) > 0

(R0    r0) +B

(IC)
Under this constraint, bank owners need a minimum share of  = B= to monitor loans
properly.6 Therefore, the bank can raise at most a fraction  =
 
1   of its income at t = 1
in the capital market at date t = 1=2 if it is required to exert e¤ort to monitor loans.7 ;8 We
assume that at t = 0, the entire share of the bank prots belongs to the bank owners, and
therefore, moral hazard is not a concern at the beginning, whereas it can become an issue at
6See Hart and Moore (1994) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) for models with similar incentive-
compatibility constraints.
7In other words, bank-level moral hazard in our model can be addressed by greater ownership of banks
by insiders. Caprio et al (2005) document that banks in general are not widely held (a widely-held bank
is one that has no legal entity owning 10 percent or more of the voting rights), similar to the ndings of
La Porta et al (1999) for corporations in general. This observation is stronger for countries with weaker
shareholder protection laws. They also nd that greater inside ownership enhances bank valuation in such
countries. Overall, these ndings are consistent with the key assumptions of our model since weaker protection
laws should imply a greater risk of cash-ow appropriation by insiders, and, in turn, lead to greater inside
ownership of banks in equilibrium.
8Alternatively, we could have assumed that when the bank does not exert e¤ort, the value of the high return
is R0, but the probability of having the high return is lower, say L0 < 0, and its owners enjoy a non-pecuniary
benet of B, with
 
0   L0

R0 > B: In that case, the incentive compatibility constraint can be written as
0 (R0   r0) > L0 [ (R0   r0) +B] : Hence, bank owners need a minimum share of  =

L0 B
(0 L0 )(R0 r0)

to monitor these loans prudently. Therefore, the bank can raise at most a fraction  =
 
1   of its future
income in the capital market if it is required to exert e¤ort. For simplicity, we model moral hazard using
returns, rather than probabilities, and assume that the returns are not veriable. While this does not change
any of our results, it simplies the expressions considerably.
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t = 1=2 when the bank wants to pledge its future cash ow in the capital market.
We assume that deposits are fully insured in the rst period. Note that the second period
is the last period in our model and there is no further investment opportunity. As a result,
our analysis is not a¤ected by whether deposits are insured for the second investment or not.
Finally, we make technical assumptions (A1)(A4) which are contained in the Appendix. We
refer to these at a few relevant points of our analysis.
If a banks return from the rst-period investment is high, then the bank operates one
more period and makes the second-period investment. If the return is low, then the bank is
in default and its assets are put up for sale at t = 1
2
.
When banks with the high return from the rst period investment want to acquire failed
banksassets, they use the liquid asset in their portfolio and/or try to raise funds from the
capital market against their future return. However, because of moral hazard, banks cannot
fully pledge their future income, but only a fraction  of it.
Depending on the rst period returns, a proportion k = (1  0) of banks fail. Since
banks are identical at t = 0, we denote without loss of generality the possible states at t = 1
with k.
4 Analysis
We analyze the model proceeding backwards from the second period to the rst period.
The surviving banks operate for another period at t = 1. The probability of having
the high return is equal to 1 for each bank. As this is the last period, there is no further
investment opportunity and no asset sales take place in this period. Since the risky asset
has a higher expected return than the safe asset and there is no asset purchase opportunity,
banks invest all their funds in the risky asset at t = 1. The expected payo¤ to the bank from
its second-period investment is thus 1 (R1   r1) = p.
Next, we investigate the sale of failed banksassets and the resulting asset prices.
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4.1 Asset sales and liquidation values
In examining the purchase of failed banks assets, several interesting issues arise. First,
surviving banks may compete with each other if there are enough resources with them to
acquire all failed banksassets. Second, unless the game for asset acquisition is specied with
reasonable restrictions, an abundance of equilibria arises. To keep the analysis tractable and
at the same time reasonable, we make the following assumptions:
(i) The regulator pools all failed banksassets and auctions these assets to the surviving
banks.
(ii) Denoting the surviving banks as i 2 [0; 1 k], each surviving bank submits a schedule
yi(p) for the amount of assets they are willing to purchase as a function of the price p at
which a unit of the banking asset (inclusive of associated deposits) is being auctioned.
(iii) The regulator determines the auction price p so as to maximize the output of the
banking sector subject to the natural constraint that portions allocated to surviving banks
add up at most to the number of failed banks, that is,Z 1 k
0
yi(p)di  k: (3)
(iv) We focus on the symmetric outcome where all surviving banks submit the same
schedule, that is, yi(p) = y(p) for all i 2 [0; 1].
First, we derive the demand schedule for surviving banks. Note that a surviving bank
can generate a maximum return of p from the risky asset in the second period. Hence, the
maximum price a surviving bank is willing to pay for a failed banks asset is p. Also, a
surviving bank can generate ( [(1  l)R0   r0]) units from the capital market at t = 1=2.9
Hence, the resources available with a surviving bank for purchasing failed banking assets is
equal to
L = l +  [(1  l)R0   r0] ; (4)
9We assume that at t = 1=2 the bank can generate funds only against the return at t = 1; which has been
publicly revealed. This is because at t = 1=2, the second investment has not yet arrived and the bank cannot
generate any funds against such investments due to what is often called in corporate nance literature as the
bogus entrepreneurproblem. This refers to the severe adverse selection problem that rms face in raising
funds against their growth options due to pooling with rms and entrepreneurs who may also approach capital
markets for funding against bogus" growth plans.
9
provided that the return from the risky asset is enough to pay old depositors, that is, when
(1 l)R0 > r0: ForR0 =
 
b  1 l
2

; this condition is met when l 6 lmax =
p
b2   2 + (1  b) ;
and we show later on that under assumptions (A1) and (A2), banks never hold a level of
liquidity l greater than lmax in equilibrium. Finally, Assumption (A2) also guarantees that
the liquidity banks have for asset purchases increases as they hold more liquid asset in their
portfolio, that is, @L
@l
> 0:
Note that the expected prots of a surviving bank from the asset purchase can be cal-
culated as: y(p)[p   p]: The surviving bank wishes to maximize these prots subject to the
resource constraint y(p)  p  L: Hence, for p < p, surviving banks are willing to purchase the
maximum amount of assets using their resources. Thus, demand schedule for surviving banks
is y(p) = L
p
. For p > p, the demand is y(p) = 0, and for p = p, banks are indi¤erent between
values of y(p) over the range
h
0; L
p
i
. In words, as long as purchasing assets is protable, a
surviving bank wishes to use up all its resources to purchase failed banksassets.
Next, we analyze how the regulator allocates failed banksassets and the resulting price
function. The regulator cannot set p > p since in this case y(p) = y2(p) = 0. If p 6 p; and the
proportion of failed banks is su¢ ciently small, then the surviving banks have enough funds
to pay the full price for all failed banksassets. Specically, for k  k; where
k =

L
L+ p

; (5)
the regulator sets the price at p(k) = p. At this price, surviving banks are indi¤erent
between any quantity of assets purchased. Hence, we assume that the regulator allocates a
share y(p) = k
1 k to each surviving bank.
For values of k > k, surviving banks cannot pay the full price for all failed banksassets
and the regulator sets the price at
p(k) =
(1  k)L
k
: (6)
Note that, in this region, surviving banks use all available funds and the price falls as the
number of failures increase. This e¤ect is basically the cash-in-the-market pricing as in Allen
and Gale (1994, 1998) and is also akin to the industry-equilibrium hypothesis of Shleifer and
Vishny (1992). The resulting price function is formally stated in the following proposition
and is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Proposition 1 The price of failed banks assets as a function of the proportion of failed
banks is as follows:
p(k) =
(
p for k 6 k
(1 k)L
k
for k > k
: (7)
From equation (5), one can easily see that as banks hold less of the liquid asset, k decreases,
that is, the region over which the price is equal to the fundamental price p shrinks. In turn,
from Proposition 1 and Figure 2, one can easily see that for all values of k; when banks hold
less of the liquid asset, prices deviate more from the fundamental price, that is, (p  p(k))
(weakly) increases. This gives us the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 For all k 2 [0; 1]; as liquidity in banksportfolio l decreases, price deviates more
from the fundamental price p; that is, (p  p(k)) (weakly) increases.
4.2 Bankschoice of liquidity
Consider a representative bank at the ex-ante stage. Formally, the objective of each bank at
date 0 is to choose a portfolio of the safe and the risky asset, namely (l; 1  l), that maximizes
the sum of expected prots at t = 1 and t = 2, which consists of the expected prots from
(i) their own investments taking account of the opportunity cost of holding liquid assets in
their portfolio, and (ii) asset purchases when they survive.
Using the prices derived in Proposition 1, we can calculate prots for surviving banks from
asset purchases. When only a small proportion of banks fail, k  k, surviving banks pay the
full price for the acquired assets and do not capture any surplus from the asset purchase. In
these cases, from an ex-post stand point, banks carry excess liquidity in their portfolio and
incur losses from forgone investment in the risky asset.
When the proportion of failed banks is high, k > k, each surviving bank captures a surplus
from asset purchase that equals
y(p)  (p  p) = kp
1  k   L: (8)
In all cases, bank owners of failed banks have no continuation payo¤s.
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Given this analysis, we can formalize each banks portfolio choice that gives rise to a
competitive equilibrium as follows. Banksproblem is to choose l that maximizes
E((l)) = E
0BBB@0
26664[l + (1  l)R0(l)  r0]| {z }
prot 1st investment
+ L

p  p(k)
p(k)

| {z }
prot asset purchase
+ p|{z}
prot 2nd investment
37775
1CCCA ; (9)
where p(k) is the market clearing price given in Proposition 1. The rst order condition
(FOC) for the maximization problem is given as:
E

0

1 R0 + (1  l)dR0
dl

+

1  R0 + (1  l)dR0
dl
 
p  p(k)
p(k)

= 0 (10)
We dene
 = 0

p  p(k)
p(k)

; (11)
as the expected benet from asset purchase per unit of liquidity. See Figure 3 for an illustra-
tion of  as a function of k: Note that  is independent of l when viewed from a price-taking
banks perspective, but in equilibrium, p(k) depends on the aggregate liquidity in state k.
Hence, banks equilibrium choice of liquid asset holdings is given by a xed point that is
formally stated below and illustrated in Figure 4.
Proposition 2 Bankschoice of liquidity bl that satises the FOC in (10) is given by
bl = min1;max0; 1  b+ E(0) + E()
E(0) + E()

: (12)
The unique aggregate level of liquidity l is the xed-point of
bl(E(0);  ; E((0;  ; l))) = l: (13)
Let lmax =
p
b2   2 + (1  b) : Then, we have l  lmax < 1: In particular, it is not optimal
for banks to invest everything in the safe asset.
Note that bl is a (weakly) declining function of aggregate liquidity l. The intuition for
this is that if aggregate liquidity is low, then the deviation of prices from the fundamental
value is high, creating a motive to hold liquidity to acquire failed banks at lower prices.
Conversely, if aggregate liquidity is high, then the expected gain from asset purchases is low
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and the incentives of a bank to carry liquid bu¤ers is low as well. Note also that the strategic
benet of holding liquid assets for an individual bank, given by ; depends on the liquidity
in the whole market, since the market liquidity l a¤ects the price p(k). The endogenous
determination of prices, and, in turn, of the strategic benet to banks from acquiring other
banks, is an important feature of our model.
Several aspects of banks private choice of liquidity l deserve mention. First, under
assumption A1 (that b > 2), banks never have an incentive to hold liquidity if pledgeability
of future cash ows () is su¢ ciently high. Specically, if  = 1, then l = 0, the portfolio
choice that trades o¤ simply the expected returns to the bank owners from the risky asset
and the safe asset. In particular, in this case both assets are fully liquid so that the optimal
portfolio choice is not a¤ected by inter-temporal liquidity considerations and consists of only
risky investment.
Second, if the pledgeability of future cash ows is su¢ ciently low ( < 1), then liquidity
cannot be generated against full expected value of uncertain cash ows. As a result, there is
an inter-temporal motive to hold liquidity: Specically, liquid holdings exceed those from the
myopic portfolio choice problem as liquid assets dominate risky assets in future states where
there is a strategic benet from acquiring failed banks at cash-in-the-market prices (k > k).
Finally, there is no precautionary motive for holding liquidity in our set-up. Since banks
raise one unit of deposits at date 0, the only way banks can avoid default altogether is to
store the entire unit in liquid holdings, but this leaves bankowners with no residual claim after
paying back deposits. This is suboptimal since even with an innitesimally small likelihood
of success from the risky asset, a bank investing in at least some risky assets can survive
when other banks are in default and purchase them all. Indeed, we show in the appendix
that regardless of the likelihood of success of the risky asset, banks never invest everything in
the safe asset. This lack of liquid holdings for precautionary reasons is specic to the model
feature that default or lack thereof is tied in a binomial fashion to success and failure of the
risky asset, rather than in a continuous fashion as mix between safe and risky assets changes.
Nevertheless, it illustrates that the motivation for liquid asset holdings in our model stems
purely from the strategic benet they provide to banks in acquiring failed banks.
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4.3 Comparative statics
In this section, we analyze how bankschoice of liquidity and their equity value, measured
by expected prots, are a¤ected by model parameters. We investigate the e¤ects of the
development of capital markets and the business cycle. These e¤ects form the primary testable
implications of our model.10
In developed economies, we would expect highly developed capital markets where banks
can generate funds easily against future prots. Hence, one can interpret  in our model as a
proxy for the level of development in capital markets in the context of di¤erent countries. Also,
we know that the cost of issuing capital rises, or in other words, the pledgeability of future
returns,  ; decreases during economic downturns and crises, when viewed in the context of a
single economy. We show below that for low values of  , that is for less-developed economies
and during economic downturns and crises, banks hoard more liquidity since they do not
expect to have easy or cheap access to capital markets for raising funds in case acquisition
opportunities arise.
Also, during boom periods it is more likely that risky investments will pay o¤well. To this
end, we consider two di¤erent probability distributions, f and g; for 0 to represent reces-
sions and boom periods, respectively, by assuming that g rst order stochastically dominates
(FOSD) f: We show that in equilibrium, banks invest less in the liquid asset during boom
periods.
Combining these two results, we get the following formal Proposition.
Proposition 3 Let f and g be two probability distributions for 0, where g FOSD f: Banks
choice of liquidity l and value of banksequity E() have the following features:
(i) As the pledgeability of future returns,  ; increases, l decreases.
(ii) Let lf and l

g be the liquid asset holdings of banks under probability distributions f and
g, respectively, and let Ef ((lf )) and Eg((l

g)) be the corresponding values of banks
equity. Then, we have lf > l

g , and Eg((l

g)) > Ef ((l

f )):
10The comparative static with the parameter b is straightforward and not formally stated: Since R0 =
b     1 l2 , as b increases, the return from the risky asset increases, which also increases the liquidity banks
can generate against their prots in the rst period. Hence, as b increases, the liquid asset becomes less
attractive and banks choose a lower level of the liquid asset l. This relation is apparent from equation (12).
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Note that from expression (11),  is (weakly) decreasing in 0 (see Figure 3). Increased
probability of the high return has two e¤ects on bankschoice of liquidity that work in the
same direction. First, the expected return from the risky asset increases, which makes the
risky asset more attractive. Also, the proportion of failed banks decreases, which limits the
opportunity for making prots from asset purchases at cash-in-the-market prices. This, in
turn, makes the liquid asset less attractive. Similarly, as  increases, banks can generate more
funds from the capital market. Hence, banks do not have to heavily rely on their liquid asset
holdings which yield lower return than risky assets.
It is striking that while bank liquidity is counter-cyclical in the sense that it is higher in
downturns than in upturns, bank capitalmeasured as the expected value of bank prots
or equity value is pro-cyclical. The intuition is as follows. In our model, banks optimize on
the portfolio mix between risky and safe assets to maximize direct return on investments as
well as the strategic return from acquiring failed banks in future. During economic upturns,
the opportunity cost of investing in liquid assets is high and anticipated pledgeability of future
prots is high too. Put another way, during upturns, capital in the form of expected prots is
a more e¢ cient way for banks to create current prots as well as future liquidity, whereas in
downturns, safe assets play the role of creating future liquidity more e¢ ciently. In contrast,
the e¤ect of pledgeability parameter  on bank prots is ambiguous: on the one hand, greater
pledgeability implies greater ex-post liquidity with surviving banks and thus higher prices for
acquiring assets, which reduces bank prots; on the other hand, greater pledgeability allows
banks to hold lower liquid bu¤ers which raises expected prots.
We can combine the two e¤ects on bank liquidity in Proposition 3 by modeling the business
cycle in a simple way by assuming that if g FOSD f then  g >  f : This assumption amplies
the e¤ect of the business cycle on bankschoice of liquidity. Also, from Corollary 1, we know
that as liquidity decreases, we observe bigger deviations in the price of banking assets from its
fundamental value of p. Hence, crises preceded by boom periods result in lower asset prices
and higher price volatility, giving us the following result.
Corollary 2 During economic upturns, bankschoice of liquidity l decreases. This, in turn,
results in bigger deviations in the price of banking assets from their fundamental value of p;
that is, (p  p(k)) increases.
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4.4 Socially optimal liquidity
In the following analysis, we derive as a benchmark the liquidity level of banks l that
maximizes the expected total output generated by the banking sector, given as:
E() = E [l + 0(1  l)R0(l)] + 1R1: (14)
We call this benchmark the socially optimal level of bank liquidity. The rst-order
condition for the socially optimal level of l is thus given as:
1  E (0)

R0(l)  (1  l)dR0
dl

= 0; (15)
which gives us the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 The socially optimal level of liquidity l satisfying the FOC in (15) is given
as:
l = min

1;max

0; 1  b+ 1
E(0)

: (16)
Furthermore, we have lf > l

g ; when g FOSD f .
Note that the socially optimal level of liquidity is determined by only the myopic portfolio
choice. In contrast to the private choice of banks, asset sales do not play a role as they simply
result in transfers across banks. When b increases, the return from the risky asset increases
and the socially optimal level of liquidity l decreases, which can be seen from equation (16).
Furthermore, l is independent of  . Note that under Assumption (A1), privately optimal
liquidity l is zero when  equals one. But the socially optimal level of liquidity l may
be positive. This is because while the private portfolio choice su¤ers from the risk-shifting
problem, this is not the case for the social portfolio choice. Finally, socially optimal liquidity
is higher during recessions (low E(0)) as was the case with privately optimal bank liquidity.
4.5 Comparing privately and socially optimal levels of liquidity
In this section, we compare the privately and socially optimal levels of liquidity. We show
that a crucial determinant of this comparison is the extent of pledgeability of risky cash
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ows: When pledgeability is high, banks hold less liquidity than is socially optimal due to
risk-shifting incentives, whereas when pledgeability is su¢ ciently low, (somewhat counter-
intuitively) banks may hold even more liquidity than is socially optimal. The intuition for
this latter result in the context of our model is that privately banks stand to gain from
acquiring failed banks in some states. However, from a social standpoint, these gains are only
transfers within the banking system and there is no misallocation cost associated with asset
sales within the banking sector.
Similarly, we also show that the privately optimal level of liquidity is ine¢ ciently low
during economic downturns and crises (even though in terms of absolute magnitude it is
higher in downturns than in boom times). The result is stated in the following proposition
and is illustrated in Figure 5.
Proposition 5 Comparing the privately and socially optimal liquidity levels, we obtain that:
(i) There exist critical values  (E(0)); such that, the privately optimal level of liquidity
is higher than the socially optimal level if and only if  <  (E(0)).
(ii) There exist critical values 0(); such that, the privately optimal level of liquidity is
higher than the socially optimal level if and only if E(0) > 0():
Furthermore,  (E(0)) < E(0) and conversely 0() > :
5 Some empirical evidence
So far, our focus has mainly been to present a theoretical model for analyzing the liquidity
choice of banks in anticipation of nancial crises. In this section, we provide some anecdotal
and descriptive empirical evidence that is consistent with the models implications for liquidity
holdings of banks.
5.1 Hoarding of liquidity by banks for gains during crises
We focus below on one salient historical anecdote of a bank hoarding liquidity for strategic
gains during crises  that of National City Bank from the United States banking system
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during the pre-Federal Reserve era.11
Cleveland and Thomas in their book Citibank provide a memorable account of how Na-
tional City Bank, that eventually became Citibank, grew from a small treasury unit into one
of the biggest commercial banks under its president Stillman, who anticipated the 1893 and
1907 crises and built up liquidity and capital before the crises to benet from the di¢ culties
of its competitors. In terms of actual levels of bank liquidity, the reserve ratio of National
City Bank was 42.6% and 26.9% right before the 1893 and 1907 crises, respectively, while
these ratios were lower at 25.2% and 24.9% for all other New York City banks. Also, for the
1907 crisis, the capital to net deposits stood at 35.2% for National City Bank, whereas it was
27.5% for all other New York City banks.
What was the impact of such positioning by National City Bank of the balance-sheet in
terms of cash and capital? Cleveland and Thomas report that during the 1893 (1907) crises,
while National City Bank increased its deposits by 12.4% (23.5%), deposits in all other
New York City banks decreased by 14.5% (increased by only 9.2%). Furthermore, during
the 1893 (1907) crises, while National City Bank increased its loans and discounts by 14.7%
(10.2%), loans and discounts in all other New York City banks decreased by 9.1% (increased
by only 3.7%). In other words, evidence shows that National City Bank expanded its business
operations while other banks were simultaneously experiencing a shrinkage. We document
below that hoarding liquidity to acquire business that belonged to distressed institutions (in
case of 1907 crisis, the New York-based trusts) was indeed the strategy followed by the bank.
Below is the paragraph about the 1907 crisis from Cleveland and Thomasbook (page 52)
which illustrates this point succinctly:
National City Bank again emerged from the panic a larger and stronger institution. At
the start, National City had higher reserve and capital ratios than its competitors, and during
the panic it gained in deposits and loans relative to its competitors. Stillman (President) had
anticipated and planned for this result. In response to Vanderlips (Vice President) complaint
in early 1907 that National Citys low leverage and high reserve ratio was depressing prof-
itability, Stillman replied: I have felt for sometime that the next panic and low interest rates
11Casual empiricism suggests however that such cases are not uncommon. In fact, our private communi-
cations with bankers suggest that during the most recent sub-prime crisis of 2007 too, one of the perceived
reasons for drying up of inter-bank lending markets has been the hoarding of liquidity by banks for acquisi-
tions of troubled institutions at re-sale prices, the other two reasons being precautionary motive from the
risk of being distressed oneself and adverse selection about borrowing institutions.
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following would straighten out good many things that have of late years crept into banking.
What impresses me most important is to go into next Autumn (usually a time of nancial
stringency) ridiculously strong and liquid, and now is the time to begin and shape for it... If
by able and judicious management we have money to help our dealers when trust companies
have suspended, we will have all the business we want for many years.
5.2 Bank liquidity and ease of external nance
To provide more systematic evidence on bank liquidity, we appeal rst to the robust impli-
cation of our analysis that the greater is the di¢ culty banks face in raising external nance,
the more would banks hold liquid assets. We explore this hypothesis by examining the liquid
asset holdings of banks in a cross-section of countries.
In a recent paper, Freedman and Click (2006) show that banks in developing countries
choose to channel only a modest portion of their funds to private sector borrowers, while
keeping a sizeable percentage of their deposits in liquid assets, such as cash, deposits with
other banks, central bank debt, and short-term government securities. They construct a
liquidity ratio for banks, dened as the ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Deposits, using from
International Financial Statistics provided by the IMF.12 They show that for developing
countries the ratio ranges from 14% in South Africa to 126% in Argentina, with a mean value
of 45%, with values of 2% for the UK, 6% for the US, 21% for Japan, 31% for France and
34% for Germany, with an average of 19% for developed countries.
They attribute this di¤erence among developed and developing countries to banks re-
luctance to lend in developing countries. Such reluctance, they argue, could be a response
to ine¢ ciencies in credit markets resulting from factors such as higher reserve requirements,
greater macroeconomic risk and volatility, and signicant deciencies in the legal and regula-
tory environment which make it di¢ cult to enforce contracts and foreclose on collateral. In
this paper, we argue that an alternative channel may also be at work. Banks in poor legal
and regulatory environments may nd it di¢ cult to raise liquidity against future prots and
thus end up hoarding greater liquidity. Such cash hoardings may be ine¢ ciently high and
12In particular, they calculate Liquid Assets as the sum of Reserves (line 20) and Claims on Central
Government (usually line 22A), and Total Deposits as the sum of Demand Deposits (line 24), Time and
Savings Deposits (line 25), Money Market Instruments (line 26A), and Central government Deposits (line
26D).
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result in low levels of intermediation by the banking sector.
We expand on the data set of Freedman and Click (2006) to cover about 70 countries
with data on liquidity ratios dating back to September 2003. First, we link bank liquidity to
a number of institutional variables that capture countrys nancial development in terms of
quality of disclosures, and the extent of stock and credit intermediation (relative to countrys
size). These proxies should thus all measure the ease of raising external nance. Specically,
we employ ve measures based on Rajan and Zingales (1998, 2003), which are:
1. Accounting standards is an index developed by the Center for International Financial
Analysis & Research ranking the amount of disclosure in annual company reports in
each country. Though this index from Rajan and Zingales dates back to 1990, they
report that it does not change much over time.
2. Total capitalization to GDP is the ratio of the sum of equity market capitalization
(as reported by the IFC) and domestic credit (IFS line 32a-32f but not 32e) to GDP.
Stock market capitalization is measured at the end of the earliest year in the 1980s for
which it is available.
3. Domestic credit to GDP is the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector, which
is from IFS line 32d, over GDP.
4. Deposits to GDP is the ratio of domestic deposits to the GDP, based on data for
1999.
5. Stock market capitalization to GDP is the ratio of the aggregate market value of
equity of domestic companies divided by GDP, based on data for 1999.
We nd that in the cross-section of countries, the correlation of country-level average
for the banking systems ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Deposits with these ve measures
is uniformly and signicantly negative, the values being  0:55,  0:38,  0:36,  0:33, and
 0:50, respectively. We also plot the best regression t of the Liquidity Ratio to Accounting
standards (Figure 6) and to Total capitalization to GDP (Figure 7). The graphs illustrate
that the negative relationship is quite robust to exclusion of outliers such as Argentina, whose
Liquidity Ratio has been inated due to the recent economic and political turmoil.
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While this evidence is striking, it is potentially also consistent with the explanation of
Freedman and Click (2006) that these measures of nancial development (especially Domestic
credit to GDP and to some extent Accounting standards) also proxy for frictions in the market
for lending. That is, the negative relationship may be due to lower attractiveness of risky
loans in these countries rather than due to greater attractiveness of safe assets. To help at
least partially address this issue, we examine data on international stock market liquidity
measured over the period 1989 to 2000 from Levine and Schmukler (2005). In particular, we
consider for a subset of countries three measures of stock-market liquidity, namely Turnover
in Domestic Market, and two inverse proxies, Illiquidity Ratio of Amihud (2002), and
Proportion of Zero Return Days advocated by Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2003).
While the rst two measures show little correlation with the banking-system liquidity
ratio, we nd that the third measure of stock-market illiquidity, the proportion of zero return
days, is signicantly positively correlated. The correlation is 0:25 (Figure 8 shows the best
regression t of banksLiquidity Ratio versus the Proportion of Zero Return Days). When the
Brazil outlier is excluded, the correlation is around 0:35, the corresponding correlations with
Accounting standards and Total Capitalization to GDP being  0:25 and  0:60, respectively
(for the limited sample where stock market liquidity proxies are available).
This suggests that the relationship between nancial development and bank liquidity
may not entirely be due to credit-market frictions. A part of this relationship may also stem
from the fact that nancial development is associated with greater ease of external nance,
which reduces the attractiveness of liquidity in banksportfolio choice. Overall, this cross-
country evidence is suggestive, even if not conclusive, that the hoarding of liquidity bu¤ers
for protable investments such as acquisitions may be a potentially important determinant
of equilibrium levels of bank liquidity.
5.3 Bank liquidity and the business cycle
In order to provide further evidence in support of our models implications, we next appeal
to the second robust implication that bank liquidity is counter-cyclical, that is, lower during
economic upturns and higher as recessions approach (or are anticipated). On this implication,
we rely on extant empirical evidence.
Aspachs et al. (2005) analyze the determinants of UK banksliquidity holdings and nd
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evidence supportive of this hypothesis. They use balance sheet and prot and loss data, for a
panel of 57 UK-resident banks, on a quarterly basis, over the period 1985Q1 to 2003Q4. These
data are obtained from the Bank of England Monetary and Financial statistics and relate to
the banksresident (UK) activity, excluding activities abroad. They measure liquidity as the
sum of cash, reverse Repos, bills and commercial papers and comprise in addition all types of
investments securities, such as equities and bonds. They use two alternative liquidity ratios.
The rst is the share of liquid assets in the banks total assets. This measure captures the
split between liquid and illiquid assets on the banks balance sheet. And, to capture the
liquidity mismatch inherent in the banks balance sheet, they use a second measure, which
is the ratio of liquid assets to total deposits. However, their results do not change materially
whether they use ratio of liquidity over assets, or the ratio of liquidity over deposits.
In their regression analysis, they test among other e¤ects the role of GDP growth in
determining banksliquid asset holdings. They nd that banks in the UK appear to hold
smaller (larger) amounts of liquidity, relative to both total assets and total deposits, in
periods of stronger (weaker) economic growth. In particular, a 1% increase in GDP growth
results in about a 2% decrease in liquidity, where the e¤ect is signicant at the 1% level. In
other words, banks appear to build up their liquidity bu¤ers during economic downturns and
draw them down in economic upturns. Again, while business cycle uctuations are certainly
associated with uctuations in demand for risky loans, their evidence, put together with the
cross-country evidence, provides at least preliminary support for our models business-cycle
hypothesis. More research di¤erentiating the alternative determinants of banksliquid asset
holdings and perhaps employing other empirical measures for the overall health of banking
system is warranted.
Some recent literature (most notably, Adrian and Shin, 2006, Figures 1, 2, 7 and 10)
has focused on targeting of leverage ratios by banks and its implications for the business
cycle. In particular, this literature has argued that individual bank risk management leads
to unwinding of assets in response to negative asset-side shocks, which depresses prices and
leads to more unwinding, causing signicant price drops. It has also been documented that
there is a negative relationship between equity cushion maintained by banks and their total
assets. We elaborate below that these facts are potentially consistent with risk management
at banks being primarily achieved by management of their liquidity.
Leverage ratios would be targeted by banks in a netsense, that is, with leverage being
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net of cash reserves or liquid holdings of banks. Negative asset-side shocks increase the risk
of a crisis giving banks incentives to build up their liquid bu¤ers, for example, by liquidating
risky assets and saving the proceeds. If such shocks are systematic, there may not be a su¢ -
ciently large pool of outsider buyers (such as pension funds, insurance companies, university
endowments, hedge funds, etc., depending on the type of assets) to absorb liquidations by
banks, resulting in re-sale discounts in prices.13 As asset liquidations increase, size of bank-
ing assets falls but due to liquidation proceeds and the anticipated gains on cash balances,
the net equity cushions rise. These e¤ects would be exaggerated if negative asset-side shocks
are associated with a deterioration in market liquidity and cost of raising external nance
(see, for example, Acharya and Pedersen, 2005, Figure 1) since this would strengthen banks
strategic (and precautionary) motives to increase liquid bu¤ers.
While this cross-country and business-cycle support for our models implications is ar-
guably preliminary and only suggestive, we nd it intriguing and promising for detailed
investigation in future research.
6 Entry and ine¢ cient liquidations
We revert to the analysis of liquidity choice of banks. In the benchmark model, only banks
are present in the market for purchasing banking assets. In this section, we analyze the e¤ect
of entry by outsiders for purchase of distressed assets. One interpretation of these outsiders is
as foreignbanks.14 Another interpretation of outsiders is as non-bank nancial institutions
such as hedge funds.15
13While we have not yet discussed the role of outside capital in our model, we do so in the next section.
14Krugman (1998) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) have recently documented evidence that the high
foreign direct investment (FDI) ows into the crisis-stricken countries of the 1997 Asian nancial crisis had
many of the features of capitalizing on re-sales: median o¤er price to book ratios were substantially lower
for the purchase of cash-strapped rms, especially in 1998 when national players had low liquidity, resulting
in a boost in mergers and acquisitions involving foreign players.
15The article entitled Cashing in on the crashin the Economist on August 23, 2007, provides a discussion
of the incentives to hold liquidity for hedge funds to take advantage of re sales during the recent nancial
turmoil. The article argues that vulture funds raised $15.1 billion in the rst seven months of 2007, more
than the $13.9 billion in all of 2006, to acquire assets at re-sale discounts due to expected distress in nancial
markets. The same article points out that while some hedge funds su¤ered as the sub-prime crisis unfolded in
the Summer of 2007, the others, such as Citadel, Ellington, and Marathon Asset Management had the ready
cash to benet from the crisis. For example, the article highlights the strategy of Citadel to keep more than
a third of its assets in cash or liquid securities, allowing it to take advantage of re sales when opportunities
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Formally, we introduce outside investors who are risk-neutral and competitive and have
funds w to purchase banking assets were these assets to be liquidated. These are investors
outside the banking sector, and even though they have funds for asset purchases, they do not
have the skills to generate the full value from banking assets. Hence, outsiders are ine¢ cient
users of banking assets relative to bank owners, provided that bank owners exert e¤ort. Often
such outsiders are short-term holders who re-package or securitize the assets for selling on to
portfolio investors. Such outsiders may be unable to realize the full value of the assets for
the familiar reason that bank assets (loans in particular) derive much of their value from the
monitoring and collection e¤orts of loan o¢ cers who can inuence the actions of the debtors.
Hence, when distressed assets end up in the hands of outsiders, we may expect deadweight
costs from ine¢ cient allocation of assets. To capture this formally, we assume that outsiders
cannot generate Rt in the high state but only (Rt  ): We also assume that  >  so that
outsiders can generate more than what banks can generate from bad projects.
The notion that outsiders may not be able to use the banking assets as e¢ ciently as
the existing bank owners is akin to the notion of asset-specicity, rst introduced in the
corporate-nance literature by Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and em-
ployed extensively since then in the banking literature as well.16 In the evidence of such
specicity for banks and nancial institutions, James (1991) shows that the liquidation value
of a bank is typically lower than its market value as an ongoing concern. In particular, his
empirical analysis of the determinants of the losses from bank failures reveals a signicant
di¤erence in the value of assets that are liquidated and similar assets that are assumed by
acquiring banks.17
In terms of analysis, we rst examine the sale of failed banks and the resulting prices in
the presence of outsiders. The demand schedule for surviving banks does not change and we
arise.
16There is strong empirical support for the idea of asset specicity in the corporate-nance literature, as
shown, for example, by Pulvino (1998) for the airline industry, and by Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan
(2006) for the entire universe of defaulted rms in the US over the period 1981 to 1999 (see also Berger, Ofek,
and Swary, 1996, and Stromberg, 2000).
17Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2007) extend the evidence on re-sale FDI of Krugman (1998) and
Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) for the banking and nancial sector. They document that banks and nancial
institutions acquired by foreign rms during the South East Asian crisis were more likely to be ippedback
to domestic rms once the crisis abated. This evidence is consistent with FDI entering during the crisis to
take advantage of low prices, but lacking in expertise relative to domestic rms which leads to the ipping
once domestic rmsnancing constraints are relaxed.
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can derive the demand schedule for outsiders in a similar way. Let p  1 (R1    r1) =
p  1; be the expected prot for outsiders from the risky asset in the second period. For
p < p, outsiders are willing to supply all their funds for the asset purchase. Thus, demand
schedule is y2(p) = k. For p > p, the demand is y2(p) = 0, and for p = p, outsiders are
indi¤erent between y2(p) over the range [0; k]. Thus, for p > p, there is limited participation
in the market for banking assets in that only insiders submit bids to purchase assets.
Next, we analyze how the regulator optimally allocates failed banksassets. In the absence
of nancial constraints faced by surviving banks, it is optimal to sell all assets to surviving
banks. However, surviving banks may not be able to pay the threshold price of p for all
assets. If prices fall further, these assets become protable for outsiders and they participate
in the auction. Formally, as long as price is higher than p, outsiders do not participate in the
asset market. However, for k > k; where
k =

L
L+ p

; (17)
surviving banks cannot pay the threshold price of p for all assets, and outsiders are willing to
supply all their funds for the asset purchase. For w > p; with the injection of outsider funds,
the price is sustained at p for all k > k. However, when w < p, if the crisis is very severe
(su¢ ciently large k), the total liquidity available within the surviving banks and outsiders is
not be enough to sustain the price at p. Thus, we observe a second region where the price is
downward sloping as a function of k. In other words, there is cash-in-the-market pricing in
this region given the limited liquidity of the entire set of market players bidding for assets.
In particular, for k > k, where
k =

L+ w
L+ p

; (18)
the price is again strictly decreasing in k and is given by
pw(k) =

(1  k)L+ w
k

; (19)
and y(pw) =

L
pw

and y2(pw) =

w
pw

. The resulting price function is illustrated in Figure 9
and is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The price of assets as a function of the proportion k of failed banks and
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outsiderswealth w is:
pw(k) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
p for k 6 k
(1 k)L
k
for k 2 (k; k]
p for w > p and k > k; or w < p and k 2 (k; k]
[(1 k)L]+w
k
for w < p and k > k
: (20)
Note that the introduction of outsiders (weakly) increases the price for failed banks. In
particular, for k > k, with the injection of outsider funds, the price stays at p; at least for
a range of values of k, and the price is higher than the price without outsiders, that is,
pw(k) > p
(k); given in equations (20) and (7), respectively.
Since the introduction of outsiders (weakly) increases the price for acquiring failed banks,
the expected benet to banks from holding the liquid asset to purchase assets declines. In
this case, bank is problem can be stated in the same way as in the benchmark case (equation
(9)), except for the fact that instead of ; we have
w = 0

p  pw(k)
pw(k)

; (21)
as the expected benet from asset purchase per unit of liquidity. Note that for k 6 k; w = ,
whereas for k > k, we have w < .
18 Since E (w) < E(); the unique aggregate level of
liquidity lw with outsiders is lower than l
 given in Proposition 2. Furthermore, as outsider
wealth w increases, the price pw (weakly) increases for each k. This, in turn, decreases the
private benet w and induces banks to hold less liquid asset: as w increases, l

w (weakly)
decreases.19
18See Figure 10 for an illustration of w. For k 2 [k; k]; we have w = 0 (1) : Note that w is not
monotone increasing in k. The reason for this is that, for k 2 [k; k], with the participation of outsiders, price
stays at p and the prot for a surviving bank from purchasing a unit of failed banksasset is bounded by
(1) ; whereas a bank survives only with probability 0. Hence, as 0 decreases, the marginal gain from
holding the liquid asset goes down for k 2 [k; k]. Since, w is no longer monotone in 0; the comparative
statics result on E(0) in this case is not as clean as the result in the benchmark case. However, we provide
interesting results on the e¤ect of expertise (1) and the wealth of outsiders (w) on bankschoice of liquidity.
19We observe a similar e¤ect of (1) on bankschoice of liquidity. As the wedge between the expertise of
banks and outsiders widens, that is, as (1) increases, the price for assets weakly decreases for all k > k.
Just like a decrease in outsider wealth w, this increases w and banks hold more liquidity.
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The socially optimal liquidity level l of each bank maximizes the objective function
E() = E [l + 0(1  l)R0(l)] + 1R1   (1)
1Z
k
f(k)

k   (1  k)L
pw(k)

dk; (22)
where
h
k   (1 k)L
pw(k)
i
represents the units of assets purchased by outsiders at the price pw(k),
which, multiplied by (1), gives the misallocation cost arising from outsiderslack of exper-
tise relative to banks. On the one hand, as banks hold more liquid assets, the rst expression
decreases since in expected terms, risky asset has a higher return than the safe asset. On
the other hand, as banks hold more liquid assets, they have more resources to acquire failed
banking assets, which decreases the misallocation cost.
We thus obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 7 The socially optimal level of liquidity that maximizes (22) is given as:
bblw = min1;max0; 1  b+ 1 + E(w)
E(0) + E(w)

; (23)
where E(w) is the marginal reduction in expected misallocation cost for an additional unit of
liquidity within the set of surviving banks and is given in equation (43) in the Appendix. The
unique level of socially optimal liquidity lw is the xed-point of
bblw(0;  ; E((0;  ; lw ))) = lw :
Furthermore, for w >

Lp
2L+p

; the socially optimal level of liquidity lw decreases as outsider
wealth w increases.
As a function of equilibrium liquidity l, bblw behaves similar to bl and blw. When aggregate
liquidity is high, misallocation costs are low and it becomes less desirable to carry additional
liquidity. Similarly, if aggregate liquidity is low, the misallocation region is large and carrying
additional liquidity is attractive from a social standpoint.
We show below that as in the benchmark case without outsider funds, the privately
optimal level of liquidity may exceed the socially optimal level in the case when pledgeability
of future prots is low.20 The following proposition states the relationship between the
privately optimal and the socially optimal levels of liquidity in relation to  ; the pledgeability
of future returns.
20We present our results for the case w > p: Similar results hold for the case w < p:
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Proposition 8 With the possibility of outsider entry, there exist critical values  () and
 (); such that, for  >   () ; the socially optimal level of liquidity is higher than the
privately optimal level, and for  <   () ; the privately optimal level of liquidity is higher
than the socially optimal level, where  () 6  ().
The intuition for this result is overall similar to that for the case without outsider entry.
If  < 1, bankowners have an inter-temporal motive to hold liquidity: surviving banks make
prots from asset purchases when the proportion of failures is above k, that is, k > k, but since
 < 1 they cannot pledge risky cash ows fully to capitalize on this benet. Hence, there is
a benet from carrying liquidity into such states. In contrast, misallocation costs materialize
only when the proportion of failures is above k, that is, k > k. For the intermediate region
[k; k], while banks gain by purchasing assets at cash-in-the-market prices, there is no social
welfare loss. Thus, if  is su¢ ciently small, then the private incentive to hold liquidity for
inter-temporal transfers can prevail over the risk-shifting incentive, and, in turn, privately
optimal level of liquidity can exceed the social one.
Conversely, if  is su¢ ciently high or for a given value of  if  is not very large so
that the region [k; k] is not too wide, then banks hold less than the socially optimal level
of liquidity: The risk-shifting incentive dominates in this case. In other words, when the
di¤erence between the fundamental value of bank assets and the price outsiders are willing
to pay for them is not very high, banks choose to hold less than socially optimal levels of
liquidity.
To summarize, if su¢ cient liquidity cannot be raised against risky cash ows in a contin-
gent fashion in future, then banks may carry excess liquidity (ine¢ ciently bypassing protable
lending opportunities) in order to stand ready for acquiring failed banks at attractive prices.
Note, however, that since outsider wealth (weakly) raises asset-sale prices, it has the e¤ect
of lowering bank liquidity in privately as well as socially optimal choices. The important
implication of this is that when private level of bank liquidity is ine¢ ciently high, entry by
foreign banks can unlock the liquid hoardings and lead to greater intermediation by domestic
banks. This e¤ect of outside capital on ex-ante bank portfolio choice can be an important
criterion in assessing welfare e¤ects of foreign entry in banking sectors of developing countries
and during crises, settings where cost of external nance is high.
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7 Concluding remarks and policy implications
Our objective in this paper has been to develop a theoretical framework for bank portfolio
choice between liquid (safe) and illiquid (risky) assets that is driven by strategic acquisition
motives in the backdrop of potential crises and foreign entry. We have focused somewhat
narrowly on the implications of this strategic motive, but it remains an important empirical
question to di¤erentiate it and measure its importance relative to the more traditional pre-
cautionary motive for holding liquidity. While our positive analysis of determinants of bank
liquidity lends itself naturally to empirical work, of greater consequence for policy is that we
have been able to conduct a normative analysis comparing the equilibrium liquidity choice
of banks to a benchmark socially optimal level. The most striking result here is that when
liquidity in market for external nance is low, for example, in business downturns or as crises
become imminent, banks may hoard excessive liquidity to capitalize on private, strategic
gains from acquiring distressed banksassets.
In this context, it is important to recognize that entry of capital from outside of the
banking sector to acquire distressed assets can raise asset prices, reduce hoarding incentives
of banks, and free up bank balance-sheets for greater intermediation. This suggests that the
role of foreign investors in bank restructuring presents important trade-o¤s for a country in
the aftermath of a nancial crisis. Foreign capital will be attracted by the very low prices
of distressed assets, and full the role of the purchaser of last resortwhen domestic capital
is exhausted. However, the ultimate welfare e¤ects of such foreign entry will depend on
the complex interplay between the cushioning of price in the event of a crisis, the ex-ante
portfolio choices in anticipation of such entry, and the ability of the foreign entrant to manage
the assets they acquire.
Such policy implications seem pertinent and are worthy of further study, both theo-
retically, for example, by allowing for formal business-cycle dynamics, and empirically, for
example, in the form of specic case studies linking the ex-ante choice of bank liquidity to
the regulatory choice of closure and asset-sale policies as well as of liquidity injections. It also
appears interesting to test jointly the implication of our model that while bank liquidity is
counter-cyclical, bank capital is pro-cyclical.
We conclude by touching on one theme concerning the e¤ect of regulatory closure policies
on bank liquidity in our setup. In unreported results, we have incorporated in our setup costly
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provision of deposit insurance and crises resolution policies such as granting of liquidity to
failed banks (government-sponsored bailouts) and granting of liquidity to surviving banks
(government-assisted sales). It can be shown that (i) scal costs of deposit insurance make it
more likely that banks will hold less liquidity than is socially optimal; (ii) bailouts result in
lower bank liquidity only if they are excessive in the sense of covering more banks than is nec-
essary to avoid costly liquidations to outsiders; (iii) in contrast, liquidity grants to surviving
banks that are not contingent on banksliquidity holdings always lower bank liquidity; (iv)
however, if the amount of liquidity provided to surviving banks is increasing in their liquid
holdings, then ex-ante incentives for banks to hold liquid assets are in fact strengthened. Such
extensions suggest that our model holds promise for further normative analysis and related
empirical work.
References
Acharya, Viral, Heitor Almeida and Murillo Campello (2007), Is Cash Negative Debt? - A
Hedging Perspective on Corporate Financial Policies, Journal of Financial Intermedia-
tion, 16(4), 515-554.
Acharya, Viral, Sreedhar T. Bharath and Anand Srinivasan (2006), Does Industry-wide Dis-
tress A¤ect Defaulted Firms? - Evidence from Creditor Recoveries, Journal of Financial
Economics, 85(3),787-821.
Acharya, Viral and Lasse H. Pedersen (2005), Asset Pricing with Liquidity Risk, Journal of
Financial Economics, 77 (2), 375-410
Acharya, Viral and Tanju Yorulmazer (2005), Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Res-
olution of Bank Failures, forthcoming, Review of Financial Studies.
Acharya, Viral and Tanju Yorulmazer (2007), Too Many to Fail - An Analysis of Time-
inconsistency in Bank Closure Policies, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 16 (1),
1-31.
Acharya, Viral, Denis Gromb and Tanju Yorulmazer (2007), Imperfect Competition in the
Inter-Bank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking, Working Paper,
London Business School.
30
Acharya, Viral, Hyun Song Shin and Tanju Yorulmazer (2007), Fire-sale FDI, Working
Paper, London Business School.
Adrian, Tobias and Hyun Song Shin (2006), Money, Liquidity and Financial Cycles, Working
Paper, Princeton University.
Aguiar, Mark and Gita Gopinath (2005) Fire-Sale FDI and Liquidity Crises, The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 87 (3), 439-542
Allen, Franklin and Douglas Gale (1994), Limited Market Participation and Volatility of
Asset Prices, American Economic Review, 84, 933-955.
Allen, Franklin and Douglas Gale (1998), Optimal Financial Crises, Journal of Finance, 53,
1245-1284
Allen, Franklin and Douglas Gale (2004a), Financial Fragility, Liquidity and Asset Prices,
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2 (6), 1015-1048.
Allen, Franklin and Douglas Gale (2004b), Financial Intermediaries and Markets, Econo-
metrica, 72, 1023-1061.
Allen, Franklin and Douglas Gale (2005), From Cash-in-the-Market Pricing to Financial
Fragility, Journal of the European Economic Association, 3 (2-3), 535-546.
Amihud, Yakov (2002), Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time- Series Ef-
fects, Journal of Financial Markets, 5, 3156.
Aspachs, Oriol, Erlend Nier and Muriel Tiesset (2004), Liquidity, Banking Regulation and
the Macroeconomy, mimeo., Bank of England.
Bekaert, G., C. R. Harvey, and C. Lundblad (2003), Liquidity and Expected Returns:
Lessons from Emerging Markets, Working Paper, Columbia University.
Berger, Philip, Eli Ofek and Itzhak Swary (1996) Investor Valuation of the Abandonment
Option, Journal of Financial Economics, 42, 257287.
Bernardo, Antonio E. and IvoWelch (2004), Liquidity and Financial Market Runs, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 199 (1), 135-158.
31
Bhattacharya, Sudipto and Douglas Gale (1987), Preference Shocks, Liquidity and Central
Bank Policy, in William Barnett and Kenneth Singleton, eds.: New Approaches to
Monetary Economics, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Brunnermeier, Markus and Lasse Heje Pedersen (2005), Predatory Trading, Journal of Fi-
nance, Vol. 60, No. 4, 1825-63.
Caballero, Ricardo and Arvind Krishnamurthy (2001), International and Domestic Collat-
eral Constraints in a Model of EmergingMarket Crises, Journal of Monetary Economics,
48(3), 513-548.
Caprio, Gerard, Luc Laeven, and Ross Levine (2005) Governance and Bank Valuation,
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Brown University.
Cifuentes, Rodrigo, Gianluigi Ferucci and Hyun Song Shin (2005), Liquidity Risk and Con-
tagion, Journal of the European Economic Association, 3 (2-3), 556-566.
Cleveland, van B. Harold and Thomas F. Huertas (1985) Citibank, 1812-1970, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Diamond, Douglas and Philip Dybvig (1983) Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,
Journal of Political Economy, 91, 401-419.
Diamond, Douglas and Raghuram Rajan (2005), Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises,
Journal of Finance, Vol. LX(2), 615647.
Donaldson, R.G. (1992), Costly Liquidation, Interbank Trade, Bank Runs and Panics, Jour-
nal of Financial Intermediation, 2, 59-85.
Freedman, Paul and Reid Click (2006) Banks that Dont Lend? Unlocking Credit to Spur
Growth in Developing Countries, Development Policy Review, 24 (3), 279-302.
Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin (2003), BanksLiquidity Demand in the Presence of a Lender of
Last Resort, mimeo, Universidad de San Andrés.
Gorton, Gary and Lixin Huang (2004) Liquidity, E¢ ciency, and Bank Bailouts, American
Economic Review, 94(3), 455483.
32
Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1994) A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human
Capital, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 841879.
He, Zhiguo and Arvind Krishnamurthy (2006) Intermediation, Capital Immobility and Asset
Prices, working paper, Northwestern University, Kellogg School.
Holmstrom, Bengt and Jean Tirole (1998) Private and Public Supply of Liquidity, Journal
of Political Economy, 106(1), 140.
Holmstrom, Bengt and Jean Tirole (2001) LAPM A Liquidity-Based Asset Pricing Model,
Journal of Finance, Vol 56 (5), 2001.
James, Christopher (1991) The Losses Realized in Bank Failures, Journal of Finance, 46(4),
12231242.
Krugman, Paul (1998) Fire-sale FDI, available at http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/FIRESALE.htm
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez de Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (1999) Corporate Owner-
ship Around the World, Journal of Finance, 54, 471-517.
Levine, Ross and Sergio Schmukler (2005) Internalization and Stock Market Liquidity,
NBER Working Paper 11894.
Morris, Stephen and Hyun Shin (2004), Liquidity Black Holes, Review of Finance, 8, 1-18.
Pulvino, Todd C. (1998) Do Asset Fire Sales Exist: An Empirical Investigation of Commer-
cial Aircraft Sale Transactions, Journal of Finance, 53, 939-978.
Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales (1998) Financial Dependence and Growth, American
Economic Review, volume 88, 559-586.
Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales (2003) The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial
Development in the 20th Century, Journal of Financial Economics, 69 (1), 5-50.
Repullo, Rafael (2005) Liquidity, Risk Taking, and the Lender of Last Resort, International
Journal of Central Banking, 2, 4780.
Schnabel, Isabel and Hyun Shin (2004), Liquidity and Contagion: the Crisis of 1763, Journal
of the European Economic Association, 2 (6), 929-968.
33
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny (1992), Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A
Market Equilibrium Approach, Journal of Finance, 47, 1343-1366.
Stromberg, Per (2000) Conicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions:
Theory and Tests, Journal of Finance, 55, 26412692.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1988) Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, Journal of
Finance, 43, 567592.
Appendix
Technical model assumptions: We make the following parametric assumptions to analyze
the model.
(A1) b > 2 : In this case, the return from the banks portfolio, [l + (1  l)R0], without the
prots from the asset purchase, is decreasing as the liquid asset l in banks portfolio increases.
This creates the trade o¤ between the liquid and the illiquid asset only once benets from
re-sales are introduced. In other words, the pure portfolio choice problem would lead to
liquidity choice of l = 0. Furthermore, this condition also guarantees that R0 > r0 = 1.
(A2)  < 1=b : This guarantees that the liquidity banks have for asset purchases increases
as they hold more liquid asset l in their portfolio, that is, @L
@l
> 0.
(A3)  <
 
b  3
2

: Note that the maximum value  can take, denoted by max, is equal
to (R0   r0) : This condition guarantees that  < max.
(A4) B 6


2
b 1

: This condition guarantees that banks cannot generate a higher pro-
portion of their future prots in the capital market when they invest in the bad project. In
particular, when bank owners are left with a share of prots less than , they shirk, which
results in a lower return from these investments. However, in that case, they can generate
a higher proportion of their future prots in the capital market, that is, they can generate
up to
 
R0    r0

. Banks can generate higher funds from the capital market when they
choose the good project if 
1   (R0   r0) > R0    r0; (24)
which gives us  6 
(R0 r0) : Thus, we have  =
B

6 
(R0 r0) : In that case, it is optimal to
leave a minimum share of  of future prots to bank managers, both for higher output as
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well as better liquidity generation through the capital market. This condition simplies to
B 6


2
b 1

:
Proof of Proposition 2: We have R0(l) =
h
b  (1 l)
2
i
and dR0
dl
= 1
2
: Plugging these expres-
sions into the FOC in (10), we get:
E(0) [1  b+ (1  l)] + E() [1 +  [ b+ (1  l)]] = 0; (25)
where  is the expected benet per unit of failed banksassets from asset purchase. From
here, we can nd bankschoice of liquidity bl that satises the FOC as:
bl = 1  b+ E (0) + E()
E(0) + E()
; (26)
which is given in Proposition 2.
We have the following:
 =
8<: 0 for k 6 k0  (1 0)p0L   1 for k > k : (27)
Note that k is continuos in l. Thus, E() is continuos in l. Hence, bl is continuos in l. Since,bl is a continuos function from the compact, convex set [0; 1] into itself, by Brouwers xed
point theorem, a xed point of the mapping in equation (26) exists. Next, we show that the
xed point is unique.
Note that as l increases, the aggregate liquidity increases, and the region over which the
price of the failed banksassets fall below their fundamental value shrink, that is, @k
@l
> 0:
Hence, we have @E()
@l
< 0: Note that, we have sign

@bl
@E()

= sign [(1  )E(0)] ; where
(1   )E(0) > 0: Hence, as the expected private benet from holding the liquid asset
decreases, banks hold less liquid asset in their portfolio. Thus, we have @bl
@l
< 0: As a result,
the xed point is unique.
Next, we show that l 6 lmax: Note that by investing everything in the safe asset at t = 0,
banks can avoid failure. First, we look at the case where banks take risks, that is, they choose
l < 1. Then, we show that banks in equilibrium choose l < 1.
Consider rst the case when (1  l)R0 > r0. In this case, a proportion  of the remaining
return from the risky asset, that is,  [(1  l)R0   r0] can be pledged in the capital market.
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Thus, from equation (4), we have
@L
@l
= 1  R0 + (1  l)

@R0
@l

= 1  b+  (1  l) : (28)
Hence, for  <
 
1
b 1+l

, we have @L
@l
> 0 and liquidity available for asset purchase increases as
banks hold more of the liquid asset in their portfolio. A su¢ cient condition for this to hold
is  < 1=b; which holds by our assumption (A2).
For the other case, l > lmax and the return from the risky asset is not enough to pay old
depositors. Hence, some of the liquid asset l has to be used to pay old depositors, and
L = l + (1  l)R0   r0 < l: (29)
Thus, for b > 2, which holds by (A1), @L
@l
< 0 and the liquid asset available for asset purchase
decreases as banks hold more of the liquid asset. Furthermore, without the asset purchase,
the expected return on banks portfolio E

0
 
l + (1  l)  b  1 l
2

; is decreasing in l for
b > 2. Hence, for b > 2, banks never hold a level of liquidity l greater than lmax in equilibrium.
Finally, we show that banks never invest everything in the safe asset so that our assump-
tion l < 1 is veried.
The bank is safe only when it invests everything in the safe asset, that is, l = 1. Note
that, even if the bank does not fail, it has no funds for the asset purchase as it has to pay
back 1 unit to its depositors and the banks prot is E((1)) = p.
Alternatively, the bank can choose to take some risk and choose l < 1. In that case, the
banks prot is
(l) = 0 [l + (1  l)R0(l)  r0] + L+ 0p: (30)
We can show that (0; l) is increasing in 0 for all l. We do this in two steps:
 For k 6 k (that is, 0 >  = 1  k); we have p(k) = p; hence
@
@0
= l + (1  l)R0(l)  r0 + p > 0: (31)
 For k > k (that is, 0 < 0 <  = 1  k); using the price function p(k) in equation (7),
we get:
 = 0 [l + (1  l)R0(l)  r0] + 0L

(1  0)p  0L
0L

+ 0p
= 0 [l + (1  l)R0(l)  r0] + p  0L > 0: (32)
36
Using L = l +  [(1  l)R0(l)  r0], we get:
@
@0
= (1  ) [(1  l)R0(l)  r0] > 0: (33)
Note that lim
0!0
 = p: Hence, (l) > p for all 0 2 (0; 1] and l < 1. Thus, we have
E((l)) > p = E((1)) for any continuos probability distribution f over 0 2 [0; 1]; and
banks do not invest everything in the safe asset. }
Proof of Proposition 3: First, we prove part (i). Note that if bl given in equation (12)
increases, the privately optimal level of liquidity l increases. We have
sign
 
@bl
@
!
= sign

@E()
@

[E(0) + E()]  [E(0) + E()]

E() + 

@E()
@

= sign

@E()
@

[(1  )E(0)]  E() [E(0) + E()]

:
We have @E()
@
< 0; since @E()
@p < 0 and
@p
@
> 0: Hence, we have @bl
@
< 0; that is, the privately
optimal level of liquidity l decreases as  increases.
Next, we prove part (ii). Note that  is (weakly) increasing in k, therefore, is (weakly)
decreasing in 0: Hence, if g FOSD f , we have Eg() < Ef (): We have @
bl
@E()
> 0: Hence, if
g FOSD f , then we have lg < l

f .
Finally, we prove part (iii). We have Eg((lg)) > Eg((lf )): Hence, a su¢ cient condition
for (iii) to hold is Eg((lf )) > Ef ((l

f )): Since, g FOSD f , showing that (0; l) is increasing
in 0 for all l is su¢ cient. We already showed in the proof of Proposition 2 that (0; l) is
increasing in 0 for all l. }
Proof of Proposition 5: From the expressions for these two values of liquidity, we have
bl  bbl = E(0) + E()
E(0) + E()
  1
E(0)
=
E() [E(0)   ]  E(0) [1  E(0)]
E(0) [E(0) + E()]
: (34)
Note that a su¢ cient condition for the socially optimal level of liquidity to be higher that the
privately optimal level of liquidity is E(0) < : Hence, we analyze the case where E(0) >  :
As E(0) converges to 1, we have the privately optimal level of liquidity to be higher than
the socially optimal level. Next, note that bl =bbl when
E() [E(0)   ] = E(0) [1  E(0)] : (35)
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Since the left hand side is decreasing in  ; but the right hand side is not a¤ected by  ;
this equation implicitly denes a unique critical  (E(0)) such that bl < bbl if and only if
 >  (E(0)).
Using the implicit function theorem, we get:
E()

d 
dE(0)

= E() + [E(0)   ]

dE()
dE(0)

  [1  2E(0)] : (36)
Note that

dE()
dE(0)

< 0 so that we obtain
d 
dE(0)
< 0 for E(0) <

1  E()
2

: (37)
See Figure 5 for an illustration. }
Proof of Proposition 7: We provide the proof for the case w > p:21 We have the FOC as:
1 + E(0) [ b+ (1  l)] + T2; (38)
where, using Leibnizs rule, we get:
T2 =   (1)
24 1Z
k
f(k)

 (1  k)
p
 
1  R0(l) + (1  l)

dR0
dl

dk
35
+(1)

k   (1  k)L
p

| {z }
=0

dk
dl

: (39)
Note that at k = k, all failed banksassets are purchased by surviving banks and the second
term in equation (39) is equal to 0. Using R0(l) =
h
b  (1 l)
2
i
and dR0
dl
= 1
2
; we get:
T2 = [1 +  ( b+ 1  l)]
241
p
 1Z
k
f(k)(1  k) dk
35 : (40)
Thus, the FOC can be written as
1 + E(0) ( b+ 1  l) + E(w) [1 +  ( b+ 1  l)] = 0; (41)
21The proof for the case w < p is available upon request.
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where E(w) =

1
p
  1R
k
f(k)(1  k) dk
!
: Equation (41) looks very much like the FOC
for bankschoice of liquidity with the slight di¤erence that in the rst expression, we have 1
instead of 0; since banks can benet from their liquid assets only when they survive, which
happens with a probability of 0; whereas the regulator always benets from banksliquid
assets.
From here, we can nd the socially optimal level of liquidity bblw that satises the FOC as:
bblw = 1  b+ 1 + E(w)
E(0) + E(w)
; where (42)
w =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 for k 6 k
0

1
p

for w > p and k < k or w < p and k 2 (k; k]
0

1
pw(k)

w
(1 k)L+w

for w < p and k > k
; (43)
in its general form. We can show that a xed point of the mapping in equation (42) exists
and is unique.
Note that k is continuos in l. Thus, E(w) is continuos in l. Hence,
bblw is continuos in l.
Since, bblw is a continuos function from the compact, convex set [0; 1] into itself, by Brouwers
xed point theorem, a xed point of the mapping in equation (42) exists. Next, we show that
the xed point is unique.
Note that as l increases, the aggregate level of liquidity increases, the region over which
sales to outsiders take place shrinks, that is, @k
@l
> 0: Hence, we have @E(w)
@l
< 0: We have
@
bblw
@E(w)
=
E(0) + E(w)   [1 + E(w)]
[E(0) + E(w)]
2 =
E(0)  
[E(0) + E(w)]
2 :
Thus, for E(0) > ; we have @
bblw
@E(w)
> 0; which gives us @
bblw
@l
< 0: Hence, the xed point is
unique.
Next we analyze how the socially optimal level of liquidity lw changes with outsider wealth
w. Now, let
h =
kwp
[(1  k)L+ w]2 : (44)
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Note that as the function h increases, E (w) and the socially optimal level of liquidity lw
increases. We have
@h
@w
=
kp [(1  k)L+ w]2   2kwp [(1  k)L+ w]
[(1  k)L+ w]4 =
kp [(1  k)L  w]
[(1  k)L+ w]3 : (45)
If @h
@w
< 0 for k 2 [k; 1]; then the socially optimal level of liquidity lw decreases as outsider
wealth w increases.
We have @h
@w
< 0 when w > (1  k)L: For k = 1, this trivially holds.
For k = k, we have
w >

p  w
L+ p

L() w  L+ p >  p  wL() w >  Lp
2L+ p

:
Hence, for w >

Lp
2L+p

; we have @h
@w
< 0 for k 2 [k; 1] and the socially optimal level of
liquidity lw decreases as outsider wealth w increases. }
Proof of Proposition 8: We investigate how the di¤erence between the privately and
socially optimal levels of liquidity behaves as a function of  and . See Figure 11 for an
illustration.
Note that for w > p; the actual value of w does not have an e¤ect on the price. Hence,
to simplify the notation, we suppress the subscript w in the expressions.
We have
bl = 1  b+ E(0) + E()
E(0) + E()
and bbl = 1  b+ 1 + E()
E(0) + E()
: (46)
Note that for regions where k 2 [0; k] and k 2 [k; 1],  and  are identical. However, in the
interim range of failures, k 2 [k; k]; surviving banks gain from asset purchases through cash-
in-the-market prices while there is no social welfare loss since all banking assets are operated
by the most e¢ cient users. Thus, in this region, we have  = 0 and  > 0: This implies that
E() > E() for a given level of aggregate liquidity. Given these facts, we rst prove part
(i).
In the extreme case where  = 1; E() = 0 and E() = 0; so that for all ;
bl = 2  b 6bbl = 1  b+ 1
E(0)
: (47)
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Since
bbl   bl is continuos in  , there exists a critical level  () 6 1; such that, for all
 >  (); socially optimal level of liquidity is higher than the privately optimal level of
liquidity.
Next, for  = 0; we obtain that bl >bbl if and only if
h() = E(0) + E()  [1 + E()] > 0: (48)
For  = 0; we know that E() = E() = 0; so that h(0) = E(0)  1 < 0: Next, we have
@h
@
=
@
@
[E()  E()] ; (49)
which is greater than 0 as shown below.
We know that except for the region k 2 [k; k],  and  are identical. Thus we have:
E()  E() =
Z 1 k
1 k
f(0)d0: (50)
In this region, we have
 = 0

(1  0)p
0L
  1

=
p  0(p+ L)
L
=
p
L
  0
k
: (51)
Note that as  increases, p(= p   (1)) decreases. Thus, k increases whereas k does
not change. Hence, the interval [k; k] widens and (E()   E()) increases. Formally, using
Leibnizs rule, we get
@ (E()  E())
@
= (1 k)

@ (1  k)
@

 (1 k)
"
@
 
1  k
@
#
+
Z 1 k
1 k
@ ()
@
f(0)d0: (52)
Note that (1   k) = 0: And since k does not change with (1); from equation (51), we
have @()
@
= 0: Thus, we have
@ (E()  E())
@
=  (1  k)
"
@
 
1  k
@
#
: (53)
Note that k increases with  so that
h
@(E() E())
@
i
> 0: In other words, there exists a critical
 such that h() = 0 and h() > 0 for all  > ; and h() < 0 otherwise.
Since
bbl   bl is continuos in  , there exists a critical level  () 6 1; such that, for all
 6  (); the privately optimal level of liquidity is higher than the socially optimal level
of liquidity. }
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t = 0 t = 1/2 States  
    
  
• Banks borrow deposits. • Returns from the 
risky investments are 
realized. 
 
  
• A proportion of k 
banks fail. 
 
 
k ≤ k 
 
 
 
• Price is the full price, p .  
 
• Surviving banks do not make profits from asset purchases.  
 
 
 
• Failed banks’ assets 
are auctioned to 
surviving banks.  
k ≤  k   
 
• Price is decreasing as a function of k and is below p .  
 
• Cash-in-the-market price. 
 
• Surviving banks make profits from asset purchases. 
 
• Banks choose their 
portfolio:  
 
o l units in the liquid 
asset. 
o 1 - l units in the 
risky asset. 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1: Timeline of the benchmark model. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Price in Proposition 1. 
 
 
Figure 3: Marginal private (φ) benefit from the liquid asset (no outsiders). 
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Figure 4: Privately optimal choice of liquidity and the equilibrium (Proposition 2). 
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Figure 5: Comparison of privately and socially optimal levels of liquidity.  
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Figure 6: Liquidity ratio and its Fitted value vs Accounting standards
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Figure 7: Liquidity ratio and its Fitted value vs Total Cap to GDP ratio
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Figure 8: Liquidity ratio vs Stock market illiquidity (% Zero return days)
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Figure 9: Price in Proposition 6. 
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Figure 10: Marginal private (φw) and social (γw) benefit from the liquid asset for pw ≥ . 
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Figure 11: Comparing socially and privately optimal levels of liquidity (Proposition 8). 
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